Introduction
On the plannet Earth the amount of natural resources is limited and their endowments are unevenly located. However, resources held by some limited number of countries are of free access under suitable economic conditions. From the consumers' point of view natural resource is nothing but a common property.
It is well known that when agents have free access to a common property resource, they tend to over-exploit the resource stock. The size of the resource stock thus declines at a much faster rate than the socially optimal rate. In most of the models of common property resources, the typical assumptions are that there are no other stocks than resources, such as private capital, and that the extracted resources are directly consumed .
To shed light on the alternative capital asset than resources, Long and Katayama (2002) have presented a model of exploitation of a common property resource, when agents can also invest in private and productive capital. The resource extracted from a common pool is non-renewable in the model. They investigate the pattern of consumption and capital accumulation. In the present paper, we try to extend their result to the case where a common pool is under uncertainty in the sense that it could have a sudden increase or decrease in the course of extraction.
The extension is quite natural when we see the present state of international crude oil market. Some oil producing countries have encountered the technological difficulties of extraction and /or social hazards. Also the past history of oil shows that unexpected exploration of new oil reserves occasionally happened. Even so, we know that the total reserve in the earth is limited, and it is expected that the resource is finally exhaustible. As a remedy, people can accumulate capital for substituting the exhaustible resource and prolong the ultimate depletion of resource stock.
To take into account this consideration to our discussion, we present a model of uncertainty on the available reserve of resource and build in a physical capital as substitute for the exhaustible resource. Speciffically, we build a model with a random jump in the stock of the resource. Fujisaki, Katayama and Ohta (2005) have already discussed whether there is an optimal solution to this type of model.
One of the main issues in the economy of this sort is whehter it could be sustainable or reaching to the ruin situation where it would have hit the minimum boundary of the resource reserve and the economy would cease to be active. It is interesting to see how high such probability is and which factor affects the probability. If the economy could be in destruction, which probability of ruin is higher under coopreative regime or under non-cooperative regime? Thus, we derive and compare the probabilities of ruin in both regimes. As far as the authors have known, there is no existing literature discussing sustainability and ruin of resource economy in probability sense as in this paper. The pattern of the resource extraction would be affected by the uncertainty. We obtain the optimal resource extraction rule, and ask how this rule is affected by the jump process in resource reserve and between the co-operative and non-cooperative regimes.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section develops the model. In the section 2 the cooperative outcome is stated. In the section 3 exhaustion and sustainable probabilities are derived. The non-cooperative outcome follows in the section 4, and the comparison with cooperative outcome is made in terms of the ruin probability and the extarction rates in the section 5. The final section concludes the paper.
The Model
The basic framework of the model is same as Long and Katayama (2002) .
There are n identical agents having common access to a stock of nonrenewable natural resource, denoted by S(t). Each agent i also owns a private capital stock K i (t). Agent i extracts the amount R i (t) of the common resource stock (i=1,...,n).
Extraction is costless. Total extraction in the economy at time t is R(t) = n i=1 R i (t), and the reserve depletes according tȯ
S(t) = −R(t)
if it is not subject to any uncertainty.
However, the reserve may be augmented or damaged several times in the finite horizon and the reserve size is affected by those jumps in magnitude. Let us consider a probability space (Ω, F, P, F = {F t }) satisfying the usual conditions and the jump process is given on this basis. The jump process takes the form dJ(t), and the resource stock is governed by the following stochastic differential equation (in short, SDE)
The stok level at time t is
where J(t) is a pure jump process given by
A ∈ B(R + × R), a Borel set and λ > 0. λσ(z)dz is called Lévy measure and we assume that
The Lévy measure expresses the possible jump size and λ is the average number of jumps to occur during unit time interval. This rather technical assumption exculudes such cases that the jumps occur intensively in any finite intervals and/or the sizes are extremely large. Assume that the extracted resource cannot be directly consumed. Instead, agent i uses R i as an input, which, in combination with his labor input and his privately owned capital stock K i yields an output Y i of final good. For simplicity we choose a measurement unit by fixing the labor input to unity. Therfore, agent i's production function is
, and the remaining quantity is invested to accumulate his physical capital. The rate of accumulation of the privately owned capital stock is thus
Each individual utility is increasing in consumption C i (t):
where 0 < γ < 1. Each agent wishes to maximize the integral of the stream of discounted utility
subject to (1.1) and (1.3), and the initial conditions
γ is the elasticity of marginal utility, and for mathematical simplicity as in Long and Katayama (2002) assume that γ = α.
The cooperative outcome
If the agents cooperate each other, they will collectively seek to maximize the same level of their welfare. They will choose the rate of extraction per agent R h and consumption per agent C h to maximize
and the boundary conditions
For the resource economy to be analytically meaningful, the boundary condition in the future is introduced so that the resource stock in any event should be finite.
Define the value function V (S, K h ) for this maximization problem by
where ρ > 0 is a discount factor, g is a given function which represents the evaluation of remaining stocks, 0 < α, β < 1. τ is the first exit time from D,
where D = {(S, K); S > a, K > 0} and a is a positive constant. Here it is assumed that the whole system collapses when the economy reaches to τ , and that it is necessary for the economy to keep the minimum sustainable level a of the resource stock. This assumption is innnocuous. It is known (see e.g. Kushner and Dupuis (2001) ) that this optimization problem is equivalent to the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation;
where
The first order condition for maximization are
They turn to be
Substituting these conditions into Eq.(2.3), we obtain the partial differential equation for V (S, K h ). As Long and Katayama (2002) have indicated, the solution to the differential equation is not simple. Instead of solving it directly we take the same solution as the one used by them. Assume that the partial differential equation has a simple solution
where A and B are positive constants to be determined. Then Eq.(2.3) becomes
where d(β, σ) is given by the following formula.
For this equation to hold for all K h > 0 and S > 0, it is necessary that the following conditions are satisfied;
Assume that
Therefore, we deduce
From these results, we can obtain the following.
Proposition 2.1 Assume that g in (2.2) is of the form
where A and B are defined by the above formulas, then the optimal consumption C h and the optimal resource extraction R h are given by
respectively. Moreover, the corresponding optimal trajectory of two stocks (K h , S) are given by the following differential equations;
The phase diagram for this system in the (K h , S) plane is almost the same as Long and Katayama (2002) or Fujisaki, Ibuki and Katayama (2004) . In fact, it is clear that if the jumps occur in the negative direction which could happen in such case as sudden destruction of the resource stock, then both the resource stock S and capital stock K h will eventually converges to the boundary (0, a).
Remark 2.1 It is easy to see that the assumption (A.1) is satisfied if we choose ρ and λ so that d(β, σ) < ρ/λ.
The economic meaning is that the average size and the number of jumps are restricted not to be so large. 
Remark 2.2 The optimal consumption rule (2.4) is independent of the stock of the resource, and as (Long and Katayama(2002)) shows, the extraction by agent h depends only on the resource stock per head, S/n. Notice that Long and Katayama (2002) has derived the optimal extraction function as
R h = [ρ/β] × [S/n] in
Sustainablility and ruin probabilities
In this paragraph, we will calculate the exhaustion probability of the stock process. Using the optimal resource extraction rules (2.4) and optimal trajectories (2.5), the stock process is given by the following formula;
where J is a pure jump process given by (1.2) and we put η = δ/β. Note that (3.1) is written in terms of the following stochastic differential equation, so called stochastic exponential;
where Y is Lévy process given by
We will need the following assumptions.
where ∆Y (t) ≡ Y (t) − Y (t−). Otherwise, S(t) may be negative (see Remark 3.1 (1)). As it can be seen from (3.2), (A.2) implies that the jump size should not be too large for S(t) ≥ 0. In the following, assume that the support of the measure σ(z)dz is included in the interval (−1, ∞) (cf. Remark 2.1). Then it is well known (see Applebaum (2004) ) that the unique solution of Eq.(3.2) is represented as follows;
τ a is the time for the economy to reach break down limit.
Sustainable case
We are going to investigate under what condition the system is sustainable in the sense that the system does not ruin. For ease of computations, suppose that {ν i , i < ∞} and {κ i , i < ∞} are mutually independent sequences of iid random variables and they are point masses of the Poisson random measure N (ds, dz). Furthermore we assume that ν 0 = 0, the τ n = ν n+1 − ν n are exponentially distributed with mean 1/λ, and the κ n has distribution σ(z)dz. Roughly speaking, the ν n and κ n mean the jump times and jump sizes of the process respectively (see Gaier 
Lemma 3.1 Let k > 0, then it follows that

E[e −kS(t)
where c = log S 0 and for each t, N (t) denotes the Poisson random measure with intensity λt, the number of jump times ν n which is less than t. We will calculate only the expectation part I 2 . Since both sequences {κ n } and {ν n } are mutually independent iid sequences,
Since N (t) is Poisson process with intensity λt, it follows that
Then we deduce
, from which the assertion follows immediately. (c.q.f.d.)
Assume that there exists a k * > 0 such that for all t > 0. SinceS(τ a ) ≤ log a on {τ a ≤ t}, we deduce that
for all t > 0. Note that c = log S 0 = log a 0 > log a. An intuitive meaning of (A.3) is that average number of jumps and the sizes are small (see Remark 3.1(2)). We can summarize as follows.
Therefore, in this case, the probability that exhaustion does not occur is strictly positive, in other words, the ruin probability < 1.
The economic meaning of this proposition is that as far as average number of jumps and the sizes are small, the ruin probability of the economy within limited time is less than one. And the probability goes to zero when the initial resource stock is large or the minimum stock requirement is small.
Ruin case
Next we study the case when the stock process is exhaustible eventually with probability 1. Due to (3.3),S(t) is written as follows:
, due to Ito's formula,
Taking the mathematical expectation, we get
Assume that there exists a nondecreasing function f ∈ C 1 such that
or equivalently,
Note that the right side is bounded because
and we have the following.
. Therefore, in this case, the exhaustion occurs with probability 1. It shoud be noticed that (A.3) and (A.4) are mutually inconsistent. Therefore under (A.4), it is not the case that average number of jumps and the size are small. The probability for the economy to survive eventually goes to zero under the assumption (A.4).
Remark 3.1 (1) The assumption (A.2) can be dropped and we can extend to the case where ∆Y (t) is arbitrary. But in this case S(t) may take negative values so that it is not good for our case. (2) The assumption (A.3) is equivalent to the following equation with respect to
k > 0, (3.4) 1 − Φ(k) = kξ, where ξ = η/λ = δ/βλ. Since Φ(k) ≥ 0, kξ ≤ 1. Note also that it is necessary that Φ(k) ≤ 1 because kξ > 0. Since Φ(0) = 1, k = 0is trivial solution of Eq.(3.
4).
Assume that Φ (0) < 0 and choose ξ such that −Φ (0) > ξ. then it is easy to see that we can find a nontrivial solution k > 0 of Eq. (3.4) . This is equivalent to the following inequality:
If 
Suppose that
then we can choose c > 0 so that (3.6) holds. It is obvious that this is valid if only negative jumps occur. Note also that (3.7) implies that E[S(t)] ≤ log a 0 for all t and also E[S(t
∧ τ a )] ≤ log a 0 . Moreover, if log(1 + z)σ(z)dz < 0,
then (A.4) is clearly satisfied (cf.(3.5)). For example, put σ(z) be uniformly distributed such that
σ(z) = 1 on (−1/2, 1/2), then (A.4) is fulfilled.
Non-cooperative outcome
In this section we turn to the non-cooperative scenario following Long and Katayama (2002) . It should be noticed that for the existence of a Markov perfect equilibrium every agent has common knowledge on a pure jump process J(t), and take it into consideration to set her optimization problem. Following the same way as Long and Katayam (2002) , it turns out that there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium in which all agents play linear strategies of the form
Therefore the resource stock S and capital stock K i for each agent i are given by the following (cf.(2.1)):
where r is a positive constant, J(t) is given by (1.2) and the boundary conditions are the same as the cooperative case in §2. Moreover, suppose that each agent i's value function is given by the following.
where τ i is the first exit time from D,
and a is a positive constant. By using the same method as Long and Kayama (2002) and §2, we have the following result. Suppose that β and the number of agents n satisfies that Then the optimal consumption C i and the optimal resource extraction R i are given by
respectively. Moreover, the corresponding optimal trajectory of two stocks (K i , S) are given by the following differential equations;
Sdt
If 1 < n < 1/ (1 − β) , then the extraction rate in the cooperative scenario is less than the non-cooperative one. It is also shown that each agent's welfare under the non-cooperative scenario is worse than the cooperative one.
Next it is interesting to calculate the ruin probability under the non-cooperative scenario. Let η = nδ/{1 − n(1 − β)}, then η < η if 1 < n < 1/(1 − β), where η = δ/β. Then optimal stock process S (t) is written as follows;
PutS (t) = log S (t) and
In other words, the ruin probability under non-cooperativer regime within finite time is not smaller than the one under the cooperative regime. More precisely, by using similar arguments as in §3, we can obtain the following.
Proposition 4.2 Assume that there exists a k
then the assertion of Theorem 3.1 still holds for τ a and k * .
As for the probability P (τ a > t), we can proceed the same way as §3.
Comparison of extraction patterns and consumption
In this section we compare various extraction patterns, and discuss the role of cooperation regime and uncertainty.
The optimal resource extraction rule under cooperation without jumps:
and that of under non-cooperation without jumps:
by Long and Katayama (2002) .
With jump process they are given by (2, 4) 
It is easily seen that
The ordering of R
N J h
and R C h depends on the relative magnitude of effects of cooperation and uncertainty. However, we can say that agents are most conservative under cooperative regime with uncertainty and least conservative under noncooperative regime without uncertainty in terms of the resource extraction. It should be noticed that the optimal consumption rule is the same under cooperative and non-cooperative regimes as given (2.4) and (4.3) . Further, it is known from Long and Katayama (2002) that the optimal level C h is the same as under certainty. The response for economic agents are free from uncertainty and socio-economic relationships among agents in their consumption behavior.
Concluding remarks
We have studied a differential game model of exploitation of a common property resource under unceratinty, when agents can also invest in private and productive capital. The resource extracted from a common pool is non-renewable, and the common pool is under uncertainty in the sense that it could have a sudden increase or decrease in the course of extraction. The stochastic reserve process is expressed by Lévy process.
We derived the optimal consumption and resource extraction rule and the sustainability and ruin probabilities of the stock process. One of the interesting result is that as far as average number of jumps and the sizes are small, the ruin probability of the economy within limited time is less than one. And the probability goes to zero when the initial stock is large or the minimum stock requirement is small.
The extraction rate in the cooperative regime is less than the non-cooperative regime under unceratinty. Finally it is interesting to find that ruin probability within finite time horizon under non-cooperative regime is not smaller than the one under cooperation.
Appendix
Two examples are shown here in which there exists solution k > 0 in Eq. 
